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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967-AFTER-ACQUIRED
EVIDENCE-AVAILABILITY OF DAMAGES-The United States
Supreme Court held that evidence of employee misconduct
acquired after an employee's discriminatory discharge does not
act as a complete bar to recovery under the ADEA. The Court
held that an injured plaintiff is entitled to backpay damages
from the time of discharge until the employer discovers the
evidence which would have led to the employee's legitimate
discharge.
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879
(1995).
Christine McKennon ("McKennon") worked for the Nashville
Banner Publishing Company ("Banner") for over thirty years
before she was discharged.' At the time of her termination,
McKennon was sixty-two years old.2 Banner claimed that
McKennon's discharge was necessary as part of a workforce
reduction plan that was intended to decrease company costs.3
McKennon suspected that her termination was due to her age
and filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Tennessee alleging that her termination was based on
age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (the "ADEA").4
During a pre-trial deposition taken by Banner, McKennon
admitted that during her final year at Banner, she had copied
and removed several confidential documents relating to the
1. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 882-83
(1995). McKennon held the position of secretary to Banner's comptroller at the time
of her discharge. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 882-83.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 882.
4. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 797 F. Supp. 604 (M.D.
Tenn. 1992), affd, 9 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995). Under
the ADEA it is unlawful for an employer "to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. §
623(aX1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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financial status of the company.' McKennon testified that she
did this as "insurance" and "protection" because she feared that
she would be fired because of her age.6 When Banner learned of
McKennon's conduct, Banner sent her a letter informing her
that her conduct violated corporate policy and that, as a result,
she was terminated.7 In the termination letter, Banner also
indicated that if it had known of McKennon's conduct at the
time that it occurred, she would have been discharged
immediately.8
At trial, Banner conceded that it had discriminated against
McKennon, but sought summary judgment on the ground that
McKennon's misconduct barred her from any recovery under the
ADEA.9 The district court granted summary judgment for
Banner, holding that McKennon's admitted misconduct was
legitimate grounds for termination and barred her from any
recovery under the ADEA." The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed on the same basis." The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari in order to resolve conflicting views
among the courts of appeal on the issue of the availability of
damages under the ADEA in the event of after-acquired
evidence of an employee's misconduct. 2
Justice Kennedy, writing for a unanimous Court, stated that
the issue before the Court was whether an employee who is
discharged in violation of the ADEA is barred from relief when,
after discharge, the employer discovers evidence of misconduct
which would have been lawful and legitimate grounds for
discharge. 3 The Court stressed that the ADEA reflects an
important public policy initiative against age discrimination in
employment decisions."' The two objectives that the ADEA was
5. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 883.
6. Id.
7. Id. The district court operated on the premise that McKennon's conduct
was severe enough that her immediate termination would have been legitimate if
Banner had known of it at the time. Id.
8. Id.
9. McKennon, 797 F. Supp. at 606.
10. Id. at 608.
11. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 1993),
rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995). The court of appeals quoted an earlier case that con-
cluded that an employee's misconduct renders it "irrelevant whether or not [the
employee] was discriminated against." Id. at 542 (quoting Milligan-Jensen v. Michi-
gan Technological Univ., 975 F.2d 302, 305 (6th Cir. 1992)).
12. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 883. While the majority of the circuits adhered to
the rule that after-acquired evidence of employee misconduct would serve as a com-
plete bar to recovery, others maintained that such evidence should not act as a
complete bar to recovery. See id.
13. Id. at 882.
14. Id. at 884. The Court compared the common substantive features of the
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intended to serve were outlined by the Court to demonstrate the
public policy considerations. 5 The Court noted that the first
objective of the ADEA is to deter discriminatory practices by
employers. 6 The Court noted that the second objective is to
provide individual litigants with compensation for their
injuries. 7 In order to serve these two objectives, the Court held
that a district court is authorized to award an injured plaintiff
relief in the form of reinstatement, backpay, injunctive relief,
declaratory judgment and attorney's fees when it finds an
employer guilty of a discriminatory discharge. 8
The Court discussed the equitable principle of "unclean
hands" as it affects the awarding of damages to an ADEA
plaintiff.9 The Court rejected the manner in which the lower
courts utilized the unclean hands principle to deny all equitable
relief to McKennon.2° According to the Court, important public
policy considerations outweighed the unclean hands principle.2'
The discussion of the Court then turned to the appropriate
measure of damages in the case of after-acquired evidence of
employee misconduct." The Court concluded that
reinstatement and front pay would not be appropriate remedies
in such a case.22 The Court next considered the appropriate
measure of backpay damages. 4 In order that the remedy serve
the dual objectives of deterrence and compensation without
ADEA and Title VII as well as the common legislative purpose behind the two stat-
utes to demonstrate the importance of compelling employers to examine and evaluate
their employment practices. Id. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5 (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
15. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 884.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. A backpay award is "[a] determination by a judicial or quasi-judicial
body that an employee is entitled to accrued but uncollected salary, wages or fringe
benefits." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 138 (6th ed. 1990). Injunctive relief is an order
of the court which would prevent the employer from continuing the contested em-
ployment practice. Id. at 784. A declaratory judgment is "a binding adjudication of
the rights and status of litigants even though no consequential relief is awarded."
Id. at 409.
19. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 885. The "unclean hands" principle states that "a
suitor who engaged in his own reprehensible conduct in the course of the transaction
at issue must be denied equitable relief because of unclean hands." Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. The importance of disclosing discriminatory incidents or practices in
the workforce and assuring that the ADEA's punitive measures are sufficient to en-
sure compliance by employers were given great weight by the Court. Id.
22. Id. at 886.
23. Id. The Court found that it would be inequitable and pointless to require
reinstatement of an employee who the employer had legitimate grounds to terminate.
Id.
24. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886.
1995
Duquesne Law Review
trammelling the legitimate interests of the employer, the Court
reasoned that the proper measure of backpay damages would
place McKennon in the same position she would have been
absent discrimination." This objective could best be
accomplished, according to the Court, by awarding McKennon
backpay from the time of the discriminatory discharge until the
time that Banner learned of the evidence which would have led
to the legitimate termination of McKennon." This outcome, the
Court concluded, would penalize Banner for discriminatory
employment practices without unjustly enriching McKennon,
who had committed misconduct while in Banner's employ.27
The Court reversed the judgment of the district court and
remanded the action for further proceedings consistent with the
Court's opinion."
In a 1975 case involving Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,29 employees who had been
discharged due to racial discrimination brought suit against
their former employer under Title VII seeking backpay
damages.0 The Court looked to the legislative history of Title
VII to explain that Congress invested full equitable powers in
the courts in Title VII cases to ensure that "complete justice"
could be done. 1 Thus, the Court noted that backpay damages
would not only be appropriate, but also necessary to place
injured plaintiffs in a position in which they would have been
had the discrimination never occurred.2  Through these
remedial provisions, the Court found that an individual plaintiff
could be made whole and the unlawful employment practice
which led to the discrimination would be deterred.33




28. Id. at 887.
29. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
30. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 408-09. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993).
31. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 418-21.
32. Id. at 421-25.
33. Id. at 418-21. The Court stated that "backpay should be denied only for
reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory pur-
poses of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons
whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination." Id. at 421.
34. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
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traced the legislative history of the ADEA to demonstrate that
the availability of damages under the ADEA included both legal
and equitable relief.35 The Court compared the relief provisions
of the ADEA to those of the Fair Labor Standards Act (the
"FLSA) 36 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."7
Noting that the remedial provisions of the ADEA parallel those
of the FLSA, the Court stated that a district court is authorized
to award relief for a violation of the ADEA in the form of
reinstatement, backpay, injunctive relief, declaratory judgment,
and attorney's fees. 8
In 1977, the Court addressed the question of whether an
employee's conduct could act as a complete bar to recovery in
Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle.9
Doyle, an untenured teacher, was not rehired by the Mt.
Healthy City School District Board of Education (the "Board") at
the end of his contract because of two specific incidents." The
first situation cited by the Board was Doyle's use of an obscene
gesture in reprimanding two female students.41 The second
incident involved Doyle's conveyance of an internal
memorandum to a local radio station in an attempt to protest
the dress code requirements outlined in the memorandum.2
When Doyle requested the reasons for his failure to be
rehired, he received a statement which cited his general "lack of
tact" in handling matters relating to his job.' The statement
also made reference to the two incidents detailed above." The
district court awarded Doyle reinstatement with backpay,
holding that the Board's dismissal of Doyle because he had
35. Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 584. Legal relief is defined as relief which is "cogni-
zable in courts of law, as distinguished from courts of equity; construed or governed
by the rules and principles of law, in contradistinction to rules of equity." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 892 (6th ed. 1990). Equitable relief is "[t]hat species of relief
sought in a court with equity powers as, for example, in the case of one seeking an
injunction or specific performance instead of money damages." Id. at 539.
36. Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-83, 585. See 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1988 & Supp. V
1993). The Fair Labor Standards Act established a comprehensive legislative scheme
for regulating labor conditions with respect to wages and hours of employment. Id.
37. Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 583-85. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
38. Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 584.
39. 429 U.S. 274, 281-87 (1977).
40. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 281-82.
41. Id. at 282.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 282-83.
44. Id. The Board's statement noted: "[Y]ou have shown a notable lack of tact
in handling professional matters which leaves much doubt as to your sincerity in
establishing good school relationships." Id. at 282.
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taken the memorandum to the radio station violated his First
Amendment right to free speech.45 After the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court focused on the fact that Doyle may have
been placed in a better position as a result of exercising his right
to free speech than if he had never spoken to the radio
station. 7 The issue addressed by the Court was whether
Doyle's behavior toward the two students was legitimate
grounds for his termination."s The Court relied on the principle
as outlined in Albemarle that employees should be placed in the
same position they would have been if the discrimination had
not occurred.4" Therefore, the Court held that if the Board
could prove that Doyle would not have been rehired on the basis
of his non-constitutionally protected conduct, the award of
reinstatement with backpay was inappropriate because it would
place Doyle in a better position than equity would allow.5"
The issue of whether after-acquired evidence of employee
misconduct could act as a complete bar to recovery was
addressed by the Tenth Circuit in Summers v. State Farm
Mutual Auto Insurance Co." Summers worked as a field claims
representative for State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company
("State Farm") from 1963 until his discharge in 1982.52
Summers brought suit against State Farm alleging age and
religious discrimination. 3  State Farm maintained that
Summers' discharge was the result of several factors, including a
poor attitude, poor customer relations, inaccurate reporting and
falsification of company records."' In 1986, while preparing to
45. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 283. The First Amendment states that, "Congress
shall make no law . .. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S.
CONST. amend. I, cl. 1, 3 & 4.
46. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 276. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the district court's holding that the Board had legitimate, non-discriminatory
grounds not to rehire Doyle, thus affording him no relief. Mt. Healthy City Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 670 F.2d 59 (6th Cir. 1982).
47. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285. Because Doyle's conduct in making an ob-
scene gesture to two students may have constituted legitimate, non-discriminatory
grounds for his failure to be rehired, the Court noted that he may have been placed
in a better position because he exercised constitutionally protected conduct. Id. at
285-86.
48. Id. at 285-86.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 284-85.
51. 864 F.2d 700, 704-09 (10th Cir. 1988).
52. Summers, 864 F.2d at 701-02.
53. Id. At the time of his discharge in 1982, Summers was 56 years old. Id.
54. Id. at 701.
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defend against Summers' suit, State Farm discovered 150
additional records that had been falsified by Summers.5 State
Farm moved for summary judgment, asserting that although the
falsifications discovered after Summers' discharge could not be
cited as a cause of his discharge, they should be considered
when determining the relief Summers should receive.56 The
district court agreed with State Farm's position and granted
summary judgment for State Farm."
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision, relying in part on the rationale of Mt. Healthy that
equity demands that employees should not be placed in a better
position than they would have been had the discrimination
never occurred.58 The court of appeals expanded on earlier
cases and held that after-acquired evidence, though not relevant
to the employee's claim of wrongful discharge, is relevant to the
employee's claims of injury and could act as a complete bar to
recovery under the ADEA.5"
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals incorporated the rationale
of Summers in Johnson v. Honeywell Information Systems."0
Mildred Johnson ("Johnson") was discharged from her position
at Honeywell Information Systems, Inc. ("Honeywell") in 1984
after eight years of service with the company.61 Johnson filed a
wrongful discharge suit, claiming that her discharge was the
result of Honeywell's retaliation against her for opposition to the
company's alleged violations of state civil rights laws. 2 In the
process of preparing for trial, Honeywell discovered that
Johnson had made several fraudulent misrepresentations in her
application for employment.63  The most significant
55. Id. at 704.
56. Id.
57. Summers, 864 F.2d at 702.
58. Id. at 705-06 (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)). The court of appeals also relied on three other mixed
motive decisions in which the employer was able to demonstrate that the employee
would have been discharged or not hired even if the alleged discrimination had not
taken place. Id. at 705. The three other decisions cited were: Blalock v. Metals
Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1985), Smallwood v. United Airlines, Inc., 728
F.2d 614 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984) and Murnane v. American Air-
lines, Inc., 667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
59. Summers, 864 F.2d at 707-08.
60. 955 F.2d 409, 415 (6th Cir. 1992).
61. Johnson, 955 F.2d at 411.
62. Id. at 410.
63. Id. at 411-12. The signed employment application contained the statement:
"I understand . . . that the submission of any false information with my application
for employment, whether on this document or not, may be cause for immediate dis-
charge at any time thereafter should I be employed by Honeywell." Id. at 411.
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misrepresentation made by Johnson was a false claim that she
had earned a bachelor's degree.' Honeywell maintained that it
relied on Johnson's statement that she had earned a bachelor's
degree when it hired her and that she would never have been
hired if the truth had been known. 5
The court of appeals reversed the district court's denial of
Honeywell's motion for summary judgment on Johnson's
wrongful discharge claim.6" The court of appeals stated that
even if Honeywell's discharge of Johnson was discriminatory,
Johnson was not entitled to any relief because of the after-
acquired evidence of her fraudulent misrepresentations.. Thus,
the after-acquired evidence rule of the Sixth Circuit established
that an employer could use after-acquired evidence of employee
misconduct as a complete defense to a discriminatory discharge
claim if the employer could demonstrate that the after-acquired
evidence constituted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
an employee's termination."
In Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological University,"s
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals again cited the Summers rule
regarding after-acquired evidence to deny relief to an employee
who was discharged due to alleged gender discrimination." The
employee, Patricia Milligan-Jensen ("Milligan-Jensen"), brought
suit against Michigan Technological University ("MTU"),
alleging that she was discharged from her job as a public
security officer at MTU because of her gender. 1 During pre-
trial discovery, MTU learned that Milligan-Jensen had falsified
her employment application by omitting a prior DUI
conviction." The trial court held that if MTU had learned of
the falsification earlier, Milligan-Jensen would have been
dismissed.7" On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision by adopting the Summers rule,
64. Id. The newspaper employment advertisement to which Johnson had re-
sponded indicated that a successful candidate must possess a college degree. Id. at
411-12.
65. Id. at 414.
66. Johnson, 955 F.2d at 416.
67. Id. at 415.
68. Id. at 414.
69. 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992).
70. Milligan, 975 F.2d at 304-05.
71. Id. at 302-03.
72. Id. at 303.
73. Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological Univ., 767 F. Supp. 1403, 1410
(W.D. Mich. 1991), rev'd, 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992). The trial court stated that
the conviction alone would not have resulted in Milligan-Jensen's discharge.
Milligan-Jensen, 767 F. Supp. at 1410. The falsification of the employment applica-
tion was more important to MTU's decision to terminate her employment. Id.
Vol. 34:215
Recent Decisions
when it stated that it was irrelevant whether Milligan-Jensen
was discriminated against.7 As a result, the court of appeals
reversed the trial court's denial of MTU's motion for summary
judgment.75
In the aftermath of Milligan-Jensen, the Sixth Circuit
appeared settled upon the adoption of the Summers rule with
regard to after-acquired evidence in cases of employment
discrimination.76 The other circuits, however, were not all in
agreement as to the effect that after-acquired evidence should
have on the availability of damages in discriminatory discharge
cases.7  After the Tenth Circuit addressed this issue in
Summers, the Eighth Circuit followed the Tenth Circuit's lead in
adopting the Summers rule. 8
In 1992, in Welch v. Liberty Machine Works,79 the Eighth
Circuit expressly adopted the Summers rule and denied recovery
to an employee who alleged discriminatory discharge." The
employee, Welch, alleged that his employer had discharged him
during his ninety day probationary period in order to avoid
liability for medical expenses stemming from a condition Welch
developed soon after Liberty Machine Works ("Liberty") hired
him.81 In preparation for trial, Liberty discovered that Welch
had falsified his resume and employment application with
Liberty.82 In affirming the trial court's holding that after-
acquired evidence of an employee's misrepresentation bars
recovery for discriminatory discharge, the Eighth Circuit stated
that employees should not reap the benefits of their
misrepresentations.83
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
Summers rule in Washington v. Lake County.' The plaintiff,
Eddie Washington ("Washington"), alleged that he had been
74. Milligan-Jensen, 975 F.2d. at 305. The court adopted the view that "if the
plaintiff would not have been hired, or would have been fired, if the employer had
known of the falsification, the plaintiff suffered no legal damage by being fired." Id.
at 304-05.
75. Id. at 305.
76. Id. at 304-05.
77. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 883.
78. See Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1226 (3d Cir.
1994). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals provides a detailed history of the split
between the circuits regarding the Summers rule in its opinion. See Mardell, 31 F.3d
at 1226.
79. 23 F.3d 1403, 1405 (8th Cir. 1992).
80. Welch, 23 F.3d at 1405.
81. Id. at 1404.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1405.
84. 969 F.2d 250, 257 (7th Cir. 1992).
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discharged from his position as county jailer due to racial
discrimination." Following his discharge, Washington's
employer, Lake County, discovered evidence that Washington
had lied on his employment application.86 Although it did not
expressly adopt the Summers rule, the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's grant of summary judgment for an employer
in a wrongful discharge suit under the rationale of Summers."
The Eleventh Circuit, in Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co.,88
was the first circuit to break from the Summers rule and award
relief to plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases whose
employers had uncovered evidence of the employee's misconduct
after the allegedly discriminatory termination occurred. 9 In
Wallace, the plaintiff, Joyce Neil ("Neil"), alleged four separate
violations of employment discrimination laws, including a sexual
harassment claim and a retaliatory discharge claim under Title
VII 9 In a pre-trial deposition, Neil admitted that she had pled
guilty to drug charges in Alabama before working for Dunn
Construction Company ("Dunn"). "1  In her application for
employment with Dunn, however, Neil did not reveal this
information when questioned.9 2 In an interlocutory appeal
taken to decide the effect of after-acquired evidence on Dunn's
motion for summary judgment, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals expressly rejected the Summers rule.9' The court found
that by offering an employer a complete defense, the Summers
rule placed plaintiffs in a worse position than if they were not
members of a protected class.94 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit
85. Washington, 969 F.2d at 251.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 257. The Summers rule was uncontested by Washington, who chal-
lenged only the factual contention that the after-acquired evidence of his resume
fraud would have prevented his hiring or would have resulted in his firing. Id. at
253.
88. 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992).
89. Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1178.
90. Id. at 1176. The four violations alleged were: (1) an inadequate compensa-
tion claim under the Equal Pay Act (EPA), (2) a retaliatory discharge claim under
the EPA, (3) a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim under Title VII,
and (4) a retaliatory discharge claim under Title VII. Id. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(dX1),
215(a)(2) (1988); 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1988).
91. Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1176-77.
92. Id. Neil responded "No" to a question which asked: "Have you ever been
convicted of a crime?" Id. at 1177. Equipped with this after-acquired evidence of
Neil's misrepresentation on her employment application, Dunn moved for a partial
summary judgment on the discharge claims only. Id.
93. Id. at 1176-78. An interlocutory appeal is defined as "an appeal of a mat-
ter which is not determinable of the controversy, but which is necessary for a suit-
able adjudication of the merits." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 815 (6th ed. 1990).
94. Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1179-80. According to the assumptions of the court, if
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found that the Mt. Healthy principle that a plaintiff should be
placed in the same position that she would have been in had the
discrimination never occurred, was not satisfied by the Summers
rule.
9 5
.In designing a remedy appropriate to the conduct of both
parties, the court in Wallace recognized that after-acquired
evidence would have to be considered on a case-by-case basis in
order to preserve an employer's legitimate business concerns
while at the same time provide relief to an injured plaintiff.96
The court reasoned that if Dunn could prove that the after-
acquired evidence would have provided a legitimate reason for
Neil's discharge, any remedy which included reinstatement or
front pay would be inequitable. 7 Furthermore, the court held
that backpay should not terminate prematurely unless Dunn
could prove that it would have discovered the evidence of Neil's
misconduct in a timely manner without engaging in discovery as
a result of the litigation." Thus, the court ruled that Dunn was
entitled to summary judgment only for the claims for relief in
the form of reinstatement, front pay, or an injunction.9
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the adoption of
the Summers rule in Mardell v. Harleysville Life Insurance
Co.1" The plaintiff, Mardell, brought suit against her former
employer, Harleysville Life Insurance Company ("Harleysville"),
alleging age and gender discrimination.' In the process of
preparing for trial Harleysville uncovered several
misrepresentations on Mardell's resume and application for
employment. °2  Armed with this after-acquired evidence,
it were not for the plaintiffs membership in that protected class, the employer
would not have discriminated against her and she would still have been employed
for at least some period of time following her actual discharge. Id.
95. Id. at 1179.
96. Id. at 1181.
97. Id. at 1181-82. Even if Dunn proved that the after-acquired evidence was
legitimate grounds for termination, the court found that backpay would be appro-
priate to serve the dual purposes of punishing Dunn for discriminatory practices and
compensating Neil for her injuries. Id. at 1182.
98. Id. Backpay which terminates prematurely is calculated from the date of
discharge until the date that the after-acquired evidence was discovered. Id.
99. Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1184.
100. 31 F.3d 1221, 1222 (3d Cir. 1994).
101. MardelU, 31 F.3d at 1222. At the time of her discharge Mardell was 52
years old. Id. at 1223. She was employed as a regional director for Harleysville. Id.
at 1222 n.3.
102. Id. at 1223. Mardel's resume indicated that she had received a bachelor's
degree from the University of Pittsburgh when, in fact, she was two courses short of
earning the degree. Id. Mardell had also exaggerated her professional experience and
employment history on her resume. Id. at 1223-24.
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Harleysville moved for summary judgment."3 The district
court granted the motion, citing rationale similar to the
Summers rule. l°4 On review, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court's order granting summary
judgment to Harleysville and specifically rejected the Summers
rule in favor of its own rule.0 5
The Third Circuit rule focuses on after-acquired evidence only
at the remedies stage of the litigation.' Once an employer's
discriminatory conduct is proven, the court deemed that
wrongdoers should not be permitted to produce after-acquired
evidence to escape all liability for their acts.107 The Third
Circuit rule emphasizes that monetary damages in the form of
backpay are appropriate to penalize an offending employer and
to compensate an injured employee.' 8 As a result, backpay
damages would be awarded from the date of discharge until the
date of judgment and not terminated on the date that the
employer discovered after-acquired evidence.' 9 The court of
appeals reasoned that limiting backpay to the date of discovery
of after-acquired evidence would lessen the deterrent effect on
an employer." As a result, the court of appeals remanded the
case to the district court to consider Harleysville's liability with
regard to the court's guidelines.' On the issue of prospective
relief, the court did not comment upon whether an injured
employee would be entitled to relief by any other remedy such
as prospective damages.
1 2
103. Id. at 1224.
104. Id. The court held that, "because of her fraud in gaining her employment,
Mardell had suffered no legally cognizable injury even if Harleysville had willfully
discriminated against her on the basis of her age and/or sex." Id.
105. Id. at 1232. The Third Circuit rule does not cut off employer liability at
the date of discovery of after-acquired evidence unless the employer can prove that
the evidence would have been discovered without the litigation. Id. at 1239-40. The
rule provides for the award of backpay damages from the date of the discriminatory
discharge until the date of judgment. Id. Thus, the date of the discovery of the
after-acquired evidence is irrelevant to the calculation of backpay damages in most
cases. Id.
106. Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1233.
107. Id. at 1232-33. Such a rule, according to the court, would frustrate the
deterrence objective of anti-employment discrimination laws. Id. at 1236-37.
108. Id. at 1239.
109. Id. In this regard, the Third Circuit adopted the Wallace approach to cal-
culating backpay damages. Id. at 1240. See Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co., 968
F.2d 1174, 1182 (11th Cir. 1992). The Third Circuit reasoned that in cases in which
an employer can prove that after-acquired evidence would have been discovered
without litigation, backpay damages could be limited to the probable date of such
discovery. Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1240.
110. Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1239.
111. Id. at 1240.
112. Id. at 1238-40. Prospective damages are "damages which have not yet
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In order to analyze the Supreme Court's decision in
McKennon, it is essential to examine the public policy
considerations weighed by Congress when enacting the ADEA.
The Court recognized that the ADEA reflected part of a
concerted congressional effort to eliminate discrimination in
employment decisions. 3 This congressional intent could not be
disregarded when formulating a remedy for injured
plaintiffs."' Although the consideration of after-acquired
evidence is relatively new to the area of employment
discrimination, the equitable principle of unclean hands has
been cited often to deny relief to plaintiffs who engage in
misconduct in other areas of the law."5 This equitable
principle established the basis of the Mt. Healthy principle-that
plaintiffs should be placed in the same position that they would
have been had the discrimination never occurred."6 The Court
in McKennon adopted the Mt. Healthy principle but disagreed
with several of the lower courts as to how the Mt. Healthy
principle should affect a plaintiffs remedy in employment
discrimination cases."
7
The Court stated that the use of the unclean hands principle
to completely bar recovery in discriminatory discharge cases
would not be in accord with the congressional objective of
eliminating discrimination in employment decisions." 8
However, by recognizing an employer's legitimate business
concerns, the Court noted that an employee's misconduct cannot
be disregarded."' Thus, the Court settled upon an after-
acquired evidence rule which punishes an employer for
discriminatory practices and does not burden an employer with
additional liability for an employee who it now has legitimate
grounds to terminate.2 ' By terminating backpay at the date of
discovery of after-acquired evidence, the Court sent a message to
plaintiffs that they may not continue to benefit from their own
wrongdoings while also punishing employers for discriminatory
accrued, at the time of the trial, but which, in the nature of things, must necessari-
ly, or most probably, result from the act or facts complained of." BLACK'S LAW DIc-
TIONARY 392 (6th ed. 1990).
113. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 884.
114. Id. at 884-85.
115. Id. at 885. For example, plaintiffs in tort actions can be denied recovery
due to their contributory negligence. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 5 cmt. a
(1965).
116. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285-86.
117. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886.
118. Id. at 885.
119. Id. at 886.





By adopting such an approach to damages in after-acquired
evidence cases, the Court seems to have missed an opportunity
to reinforce the important public policy considerations
underlying the ADEA. Although the Court recognized the need
to deter employers from discriminatory practices, the McKennon
rule encourages employers to conduct extensive searches into a
discharged employee's background in order to cut off liability as
soon as possible. 22 It is doubtful that an employer would
conduct such a search into the background of an employee still
retained by the employer. Thus, discharged employees under the
McKennon rule are not returned to the position in which they
would have been had the discrimination never occurred.
The Eleventh Circuit's holding in Wallace addressed the
concern that discharged employees might not be returned to the
position they would have been in had the discriminatory
discharge never occurred. 12 The court of appeals held that
backpay should be awarded up to the date of judgment unless
an employer can demonstrate that it would have discovered
evidence of an employee's misconduct before such date even
without litigation."4 By extending backpay damages in this
manner, the Eleventh Circuit increased the deterrent effect of
the ADEA in accordance with the statute's original intent.125
Case-by-case examination of the circumstances surrounding
employee misconduct offers greater assurance that plaintiffs will
be placed in the same position as they would have been had the
discrimination never occurred. 2 ' As a result, the Eleventh
Circuit rule seems most likely to satisfy the Mt. Healthy
principle.
The McKennon rule simplifies the remedies stage of ADEA
litigation significantly. The guidelines for awarding backpay in
the case of after-acquired evidence are clearly established. Thus,
there is no need to determine whether an employer would have
discovered an employee's misconduct on its own when
calculating the proper measure of damages.'27 Unfortunately,
the McKennon rule sacrifices a thorough examination of the
extent of the plaintiffs injury and misconduct for the sake of a
121. Id.
122. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 887.
123. Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1181.
124. Id. at 1182.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1179-82.
127. Id.
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clear and simple rule.
Without question, there is significant justification for adopting
the McKennon rule in cases of after-acquired evidence. The
Court sought to find a delicate balance between an employee's
interest in compensation for injury, the employer's legitimate
business concerns, and the dual objectives of the ADEA. The
McKennon rule makes concessions to each of these concerns
without acknowledging the superiority of any of them.
The adoption of the McKennon rule insures that in the future,
employees will not hesitate to bring wrongful discharge suits.
The shortcoming of the rule is that it does not promote the
ADEA's dual objectives of compensation and deterrence as
effectively as it should. By formulating a rule which is a hybrid
of the various circuit court rules, the Court missed an
opportunity to strongly assert the supremacy of the ADEA's dual
objectives.
Maureen A. Shannon

